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Arguably the most important campaign ﬁnance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limits
imposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Such
contribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The ﬁrst is that they prevent corruption,
the second is that they democratize the ﬁnancing of campaigns by equalizing the relative inﬂu-
ence of donors. According to the latter argument, an equalization of donor inﬂuence is desirable
because it causes campaign resources to more accurately reﬂect public support for candidates and
their political ideas. I construct a formal model to illustrate this equalization argument in support of
contribution limits. The analysis calls attention to a number of implicit assumptions underlying the
corresponding money primary analogy for campaign fund-raising. The central assumption is that
1a candidate’s reliance on large contributions is an indicator of negative characteristics not revealed
through her campaign communication. The model also suggests a method for testing this assump-
tion, as it implies a negative relationship between a candidate’s reliance on large contributions and
her electoral success. Using data on elections to the House of Representatives between 1990 and
2002, I ﬁnd no evidence that such a negative relationship exists. This empirical result casts doubt
on the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ever since the passage of the Federal Election and Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments in 1974
(FECA), the regulation of campaign ﬁnance in the United States has been a controversial and much
debated issue. Over the following three decades, Supreme Court rulings and further legislative reforms
have established a set of regulations deﬁning permissible behavior for individuals and organizations
who contribute or spend money with the intention of affecting the outcome of a federal election. Al-
though the regulation of campaign ﬁnance has enjoyed wide public, legislative, and judicial support,
the objectives being pursued, as well as the practical effects of the regulations in place, have remained
matters of controversy.
Arguably the most important of these regulations are limits imposed on the amount that an indi-
vidual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. For example, during the period I investigate
in this essay, individuals were permitted to contribute at most $1000 to a congressional candidate per
election.1 Two different arguments have commonly been brought forth in support of these contribution
1The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 raised the limit on individual contributions to $2000 in order to adjust
for inﬂation. Current law includes separate limits on contributions to and from Political Action Committees (PACs) and
parties. I do not explicitly distinguish these different contribution sources in the theoretical argument below. The central
2limits. The ﬁrst is that they help to prevent corruption in the narrow sense of that term. The second is
that they equalize the relative inﬂuence of donors and cause ﬁnancial resources to more closely reﬂect
public support for candidates (Sunstein 1994, Neuborne 1999, Hasen 1996, Rosenkranz and Hasen
1999, Foley 1994, Strauss 1994).
I refer to the latter of these as the equalization argument in support of contribution limits. It is
based on constitutional as well as practical propositions. The ﬁrst is that Congress may regulate the
ﬁnancing of campaigns with the intent of bringing about a proportionality of ﬁnancial resources and
public support. The second is that campaign contribution limits will serve this purpose in practice.
The compatibility of the former of these propositions with the First Amendment has been chal-
lenged before the Supreme Court. I brieﬂy review the Court’s most important rulings on this issue in
section 2. While the Court explicitly endorsed the anti-corruption rationale for campaign contribution
limits, I will argue that it has been unable to form a clear position as to the constitutionality of the
equalization argument. In an effort to avoid potential conﬂict, supporters of campaign contribution lim-
its have therefore preferred to rely on the less controversial anti-corruption rationale when advocating
legislation that many feel is actually aimed at the establishment of equal inﬂuence. This has led to
a situation in which the two arguments are no longer clearly distinguished from one another and the
practical questions raised by the equalization argument are rarely explicitly stated or thoroughly inves-
tigated.2 Speciﬁcally, the proposition that campaign contribution limits increase the proportionality of
point is that all contribution limits ultimately have the effect of limiting the amount of money that a candidate can raise from
a given set of supporters.
2For a further discussion of this situation and its unfortunate impact on the discussion of campaign ﬁnance policy, see
Rosenkranz and Hasen (1999), who observe that “Buckley leaves us with a jurisprudential landscape that forces proponents
of reform to cast their proposals as anticorruption devices rather than as measures to equalize political power. (...) It is no
surprise, therefore, that scholarly literature has largely ignored the intersection of money, politics, and equality.”
3ﬁnancial resources to public support appears to have been taken for granted. Indeed, I will show that
the Supreme Court itself has expressed this expectation and argue that this constitutes implicit evidence
of support for the equalization argument.
In section 3, I use a simple formal model to illustrate the logic of the equalization argument. The
model serves to derive and illustrates the central assumptions of the corresponding money primary
analogy for campaign ﬁnance. One is that candidates who collect small numbers of large contribu-
tions systematically take less popular policy positions or exhibit less popular characteristics than those
who collect large numbers of small contributions. Another is that these characteristics cannot be ex-
plicitly revealed by way of campaign communication, so that “truly” popular candidates are unable to
distinguish themselves through campaign advertisements. (I therefore call these characteristics “un-
advertisable”.) The ﬁnal assumption is that the kind of information that can be explicitly revealed
through campaign communication is less “important” to voters (in a sense that will be made more
precise below) than are “unadvertisable” characteristics. Under these conditions, a limit on campaign
contributions would reduce the ﬁnancial resources available to unpopular candidates. This would cause
a candidate’s ability to spend money and communicate to reﬂect her degree of public support. Voters
would beneﬁt from this because campaign communication would then implicitly reveal information
that is more valuable to them than the explicit information lost as a consequence of the policy.
Unlike the constitutional proposition discussed above, these practical assumptions are essentially
empirical in nature. Speciﬁcally, the model suggests that the conditions under which voters would
prefer that a contribution limit be imposed imply a negative relationship between a candidate’s reliance
on large contributions and her electoral success. To my knowledge, the existence of such a relationship
has not been previously investigated. In section 4 of the paper, I use data on elections to the House
4of Representatives between 1990 and 2002 to conduct su c ha ni n v e s t i g a t i o n .Iﬁnd no evidence that a
negativerelationshipexists. Thisresultcastsdoubtontheequalizationargumentinsupportofcampaign
contribution limits. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and additional tables are contained in the Appendix.
2 The constitutional debate
Not long after the FECA and its amendments were originally passed, its limits on campaign contri-
butions and expenditures were challenged before the Supreme Court. Those who questioned the law
argued that it would restrict the ability of donors and candidates to engage in political communica-
tion and therefore violates the First Amendment. In a landmark ruling on campaign ﬁnance legislation
(Buckley v. Valeo 1976), the Court agreed that regulations which reduce the ﬁnancial resources avail-
able to candidates would adversely affect their ability to engage in political speech. Speciﬁcally, the
Court observed that
“a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political commu-
nication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audi-
ence reached. (...) The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other
mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication
indispensable instruments of effective political speech.” [424 US 1, 19]
The Court concluded that regulations which have the effect of reducing expenditures on political
communication are unconstitutional unless narrowly targeted to achieve a legitimate and pressing state
interest. It went on to reject the idea that an equalization of relative voices constitutes such a legitimate
5interest, stating famously that “the concept that government mayrestrict the speech of some elements of
society in order to enhance the relative voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment” [424
U.S. 1, 49]. According to the Court, the only legitimate objective of regulating campaign ﬁnance could
be to combat corruption or the appearance thereof [424 U.S. 1, 26 - 27]. Based on these principles,
the Supreme Court struck down the FECA’s expenditure limits because they would constrain the ability
of candidates to communicate with voters, and because they were not directly aimed at preventing
corruption.
However, despite its clear rejection of spending limits, the Court chose to uphold the FECA’s limits
on campaign contributions. Here, the Court argued that these regulations would help to prevent corrup-
tion. Further, it predicted that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, would not adversely
affect the ability of candidates or donors to communicate. This latter prediction is of central interest to
the present discussion. It is based, ﬁrst, on a conceptual separation of donor and candidate speech, and
second, on a largely implicit theory of how candidate communication is affected by contribution limits
in practice. Speciﬁcally, the Court argued that a
“contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but
does notcommunicatetheunderlyingbasisforthesupport. Thequantityofcommunication
by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the
expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. (...) While
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association
to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” [424 U.S. 1, 21].
6Thus, according to the Court, a donor’s political expression begins and ends with the act of making
a contribution. By deﬁnition, this separation of donor speech from candidate expenditures implies that
a contribution limit does not violate donors’ First Amendment rights. This would be true even if the
regulation did affect candidates’ aggregate receipts and expenditures.
More importantly for the present discussion, the Court also based its decision on the practical
prediction that candidate communication would not be adversely affected because contribution limits
“merely (...) require candidates (...) to raise funds from a greater number of persons” [424 U.S. 1,
22]. Although this statement appears to suggests that candidate resources would remain essentially
unaffected by contribution limits, this does not actually appear to have been the Court’s expectation.
Instead, it predicted that
“given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the ﬁnancial resources available
to a candidate’s campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with
the size and intensity of the candidate’s support” [424 U.S. 1, 56].
Clearly, the Court expected a candidate’s ability to collect small contributions to reﬂect (“vary
with”) her level of public support. A l t h o u g hi tr e j e c t e da ne q u a l i z a t ion of candidate expenditures,
this prediction appears to suggest that the Court implicitly endorsed an equalization of inﬂuence at
the donor level. In other words, the Court’s decision in Buckley suggests that the First Amendment
prohibits regulations aimed at equalizing the amounts candidates can spend, but that it is compatible
withregulationsaimedatcausingtheresourcesattheirdisposaltoreﬂectactuallevelsofpublicsupport.
Furthermore, the Court clearly expected that contribution limits would have this effect in practice.
The Burger Court’s largely implicit support for the equalization argument in Buckley has since
been more explicitly reiterated by the Rehnquist Court’s decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
7Commerce (1990). In that case, the Court argued that a provision in the Michigan Campaign Finance
Act prohibiting the use of corporate treasury funds for the purposes of political communication could
be justiﬁed on the grounds that it
“aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth (...) that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” [494 U.S. 652, 660, emphasis added].
Justice Scalia argued in dissent that the Austin decision “ultimately rests upon that proposition
whose violation constitutes the ’New Corruption’: Expenditures ’must reﬂect actual public support
for the political ideas espoused’.” The decision thus explicitly endorses the objective of “calibrating
political speech to the degree of public opinion that supports it” [494 U.S. 652, 693].
As this brief review of its rulings has shown, it appears that the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold
campaign contribution limits has to a large extent been based on the constitutional proposition that
campaign ﬁnance legislation may aim to cause candidates’ ﬁnancial resources to reﬂect public support,
and on the expectation that contribution limits will have this effect in practice. While the legal debate
overtheconstitutionalityoftheunderlyingobjectivecontinues(seeSunstein1994, Fiss1996, Neuborne
1999), relatively little attention has been paid to the question of predicting and measuring the effects
that contribution limits have on candidate communication and electoral competition in practice. The
remainder of this paper is devoted to this practical question.
3 A formal model of the “money primary” analogy
The basic idea of what I am calling the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution
limits can be stated quite simply. The central premise of the argument is that the fund-raising process
8can be socially useful because (or to the extent that) relative success at raising campaign funds consti-
tutes an accurate measure of relative public support for candidates. However, differences in individual
contribution sizes imply that the relative aggregate amounts raised by different candidates will not
necessarily be proportional to the relative number of donors who supported each of them with contri-
butions. If the number of donors is proportional to the size of a candidate’s public support, aggregate
receipts will therefore constitute a biased measure of a candidate’s “true” popularity. In particular, it
w o u l db eb i a s e di nf a v o ro fc a n d i d a t e sw h or e l ym o r eh eavily on large contributions. The equalization
argument essentially says that the imposition of contribution limits serves to correct this bias.
According to this argument, campaign fund-raising is comparable to conducting a poll among
donors. This is apparent when advocates of contribution limits speak of the fund-raising process as
a “money primary”. According to this analogy, a contribution limit is analogous to a one-man-one-vote
rule in the money primary. It is conceivable that such rule a might be advocated as an end in itself. I
want instead to ask whether it serves the practical purpose of increasing the correlation between candi-
date resources and actual public support. In the following section, I use a formal model to investigate
the practical effects of such a rule on candidate communication and electoral outcomes, and to identify
conditions under which voter sw o u l dp r e f e rt oi m p o s ei t .
3.1 Related literature
There is by now an extensive formal literature seeking to understand the impact of campaign contri-
butions and campaign ﬁnance regulations on electoral competition and policy outcomes (Ashworth
2005, Austen-Smith 1987, Baron 1994, Coate 2004a, 2004b, Gerber 1996, Grossman and Helpman
1996, Potters et al 1997, Prat 2000, 2002). Formal theorists have approached this issue by attempting
9to incorporate campaign contributions into more basic models of electoral competition. Two different
theoretical approaches have been proposed. One assumes that the effectiveness of campaign spend-
ing is due to an exogenously assumed inﬂuence over some voters (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1996,
Baron 1994). Another assumes that voters are imperfectly informed and react rationally to information
made available as a result of campaign spending. This approach comes in two versions. One tells a
classic signalling story. Candidates essentially burn money and voters observe the amount of money
being burned. If the ability of a candidate to collect contributions is related to characteristics that voters
prefer, burning money will constitute a positive implicit signal that increases a candidate’s chance of
winning the election (Gerber 1996, Potters et al 1997, Prat 2000, 2002). Another approach indepen-
dently proposed by Coate (2004a, 2004b) and Ashworth (2005) assumes that candidates must spend
money in order to send messages (advertisements) to voters. Such messages may constitute mere cheap
talk, in which case they are equivalent to money burning (except that only those voters who receive a
message know that money has been burned). In addition, campaign messages may contain explicit
(truthful) information. The model developed below separates these effects by introducing “advertis-
able” and “unadvertisable” candidate characteristics (see below).
A detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this essay (see Prat 2004). Sufﬁce it to
say that existing studies have considered campaign contributions as a means by which special interest
groups are able to gain inﬂuence over candidates and shift policy away from the median voter’s ideal.
The central policy question has been whether campaigns ﬁnance regulations can reduce special interest
inﬂuence relative to that of voters. Thus, it has been assumed that donor and voter interests are opposed,
and that campaign ﬁnance policy aims to balance the two. Within the message sending framework, this
conﬂictofinterestiscomplicatedbythefactthatdonorshelptopayforadvertisementsthatmayprovide
10valuable information to voters.
3.2 Contribution of the paper
This paper contributes to the discussion by addressing a new, slightly different question. Speciﬁcally,
I ask whether equalizing the relative inﬂuence of donors by way of a contribution limit can “calibrate”
their overall inﬂuence in a way that causes it to more closely reﬂect the interests of voters. While the
central argument I am making is in large part independent of how campaign spending affects elections,
the message-based approach is useful because it allows me to explicitly discuss the effects of campaign
contribution limits on candidate communication and speech. It therefore provides the ideal framework
in which to relate the formal analysis to the legal discussion reviewed above.
Ie x t e n dt h em e s s a g e - s e n d i n gf r a m e w o r kd e v e l o p e db yC o a t e( 2 0 0 4 a )b yc o n s i d e r i n gd i f f e r e n c e si n
candidates’ reliance on large contributions, and by highlighting the relative importance of both explicit
and implicit information made available through campaign spending. In order to illustrate the impact of
a contribution limit on these two aspects of campaign communication, I distinguish between an “adver-
tisable” and an “unadvertisable” candidate characteristic. Candidates who have positive advertisable
characteristics can send a campaign message that credibly reveals this to voters. Possible examples of
advertisable characteristics include veriﬁable facts about a candidate’s personal and political history
(e.g. “Candidate X served in the military”).
As in Coate (2004a, 2004b), I assume that a candidate must spen dm o n e yt os e n ds u c ham e s s a g et o
voters, and that she must acquire the necessary resources by soliciting contributions from donors. The
key to the argument is that the size of a candidate’s contributor base may be systematically related to
characteristics that cannot be revealed through campaign messages. I refer to these as “unadvertisable”
11characteristics. Examples of unadvertisable characteristics may include speciﬁc elements of a candi-
date’s future policy agenda (e.g. “Candidate X plans to propose health care legislation that will lower
your medical bills” or “Candidate X plans to grant subsidies to peanut farmers.“)
Unadvertisable characteristics can affect the size and composition of a candidate’s donor base if
potential contributors have access to information about them. For example, we can imagine that donors
are especially interested in a particular policy area and therefore know the details of a candidate’s
agenda. Alternatively, we can imagine that donors are members of formally organized interest groups
that provide information and selective incentives to them.3 Under these conditions, candidates who
differ in terms of their unadvertisable characteristics may also differ in the size and intensity of their
ﬁnancial support, and therefore in their reliance on large contributions.
The analysis shows that a campaign contribution limit will have a positive effect on voter welfare
if and only if two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst is that a candidate’s reliance on large contributions
indicates the presence of less preferred unadvertisable characteristics (from the point of view of voters).
For example, candidates who collect large contributions may be more likely to harbor unpopular policy
positions which are not revealed in their campaign advertisements. The second is that these hidden
characteristics are sufﬁciently important relative to characteristics which can be explicitly revealed
through campaign communication. I conclude that these conditions constitute the key assumptions
underlying the equalization argument in support of contribution limits.
In addition to highlighting these assumptions, the model suggests a method of testing them em-
3Olson (1965) argued that organized interest groups can overcome collective action problems by providing selective
incentives to their members. If many contributors are indeed members of such groups, Olson’s observation that small and
intensely interested groups are most likely to organize suggests that the number of donors contributing to a candidate need
not necessarily reﬂect her “true” popularity.
12pirically. In particular, when conditions are such that voters prefer a contribution limit be imposed,
candidates who collect larger individual contributions attain lower vote shares than those who collect
small contributions. Therefore, a negative relationship between a candidate’s vote share and her re-
liance on large contributions constitutes a necessary condition for a contribution limit to be beneﬁcial.
This hypothesis is investigated empirically in section 4.
3.3 Setup
Candidates We imagine a political community (e.g. a congressional district) that is going to hold an
election. There are two candidates, put forth by political parties labeled j ∈ {D,R} (i.e. “Democratic”
and “Republican”). Each is characterized by an ideology ij as well as two other characteristics, labeled
qja and qju.P a r t y D’s candidate always has ideology 0,p a r t yR’s candidate always has ideology 1.
The “nonideological” characteristics qa and qu are randomly assigned by nature, where it is assumed
for simplicity that they are independently and identically distributed for candidates of both parties.
With probability σa, a candidate has a favorable “advertisable” characteristics (denoted qa =1 ).
Candidates who have such a characteristic can send a message (e.g. a television advertisement) that
reveals this to voters. Candidates who lack positive advertisable characteristics (denoted qu =0 ) cannot
send such a message.
In addition, candidates differ in terms of an “unadvertisable” characteristic denoted qu ∈ {0,1}.
Intuitively, the unadvertisable characteristic can be interpreted as anything of importance which cannot
be credibly conveyed through campaign communication. In discussing the model, I will interpret qu =
1 as denoting a “special interest candidate“. Relative to the “public interest” (qu =0 )t y p e ,s p e c i a l
interest candidates plan to impose a tax on voters at large in order to serve a “special interest”.4 The
4However, this precise interpretation is not necessary. The bottom line is that candidates differ in terms of characteristics
13probability that a candidate with advertisable characteristic qa is a “special interest” type is denoted
σuqa. Thus, a candidate type is, (qa,q u) ∈ {(1,0),(1,1),(0,0),(0,1)}.
Voter preferences Voters are characterized by separable preferences over the winning candidate’s
ideology (her party label) and her non-ideological characteristics. A voter’s ideology is a location
i ∈ (0,1) representing his proximity to the two parties located at 0 and 1.I f p a r t y D’s candidate is
elected, a voter with ideology i incurs a loss equal to i.I f p a r t y R’s candidate is elected, he incurs
al o s so f(1 − i). Voter ideology i is uniformly distributed on an interval [μ − τ,μ+ τ] ⊂ (0,1).













,w h e r ex represents the median voter’s expected preference
for the Democratic candidate. Intuitively, the preference parameter κ measures the strength of party D
in the district.
In addition, voters care about candidates’ advertisable and unadvertisable characteristics. If the
winner of the election is type (qa,q u), all voters receive a net transfer equal to uv(qa,q u).I r e f e r t o
uv (qa,q u) as the voter’s nonideological payoff because it does not depend on the candidate’s party
label.
I assume that a candidate of type (1,q u) is preferred to one of type (0,q u) for qu =0 ,1,a n dt h a t
a candidate of type (qa,0) is preferred to one of type (qa,1) for qa =0 ,1.T h a t i s ,qa =1denotes
to presence of a preferred advertisable characteristic (such as a special qualiﬁcation for ofﬁce) and
qu =1represents the presence of a less preferred unadvertisable characteristic (such as being a “special
that cannot be revealed through campaign advertisements, and that one of these (qu =0 ) is preferred to the other (qu =1 ).
Holding constant their advertisable characteristics, the two candidate types are exactly analogous to “high” and “low” types
in a classic signaling model.
14interest” type). Given these assumptions, I normalize payoffs as follows.
(1 − σu0) · uv(0,0) + σu0 · uv(0,1) = 0
uv(1,0) = 1
uv(1,1) = 1 − z, z>0.
Interpreting payoffs as monetary transfers, this says all voters will receive $1 if the winner of the
election has a favorable advertisable characteristic (qa =1 ). However, they must pay a cost equal to $z
if she is a “special interest” type (qu =1 ). Thus, an intuitive interpretation of this setup is that “special
interest” (1,1) candidates plan to grant a subsidy that beneﬁts a particular group at a cost of z to voters
at large.
If the winner of the election is of type (qa,q u,i 0), a voter with ideology i receives a payoff equal to
Uv(qa,q u,i
0,i)=uv (qa,q u) − φ ·| i − i
0|
Uninformed voters and campaign messages Following a common approach in the modeling of
elections, I assume that there are two types of voters. A fraction (1 − α) are “informed”, a fraction α
are “uninformed”.5 Informed voters learn about candidate characteristics from sources other than the
campaigns themselves. Intuitively, these voters are assumed to be interested in politics and therefore
read newspapers, etc. As a result, informed voters learn the candidates’ advertisable and unadvertisable
characteristics irrespective of their campaign spending.
In contrast, uninformed voters only know the candidates’ party labels and are not assumed to ac-
tively search out additional information about them. Any such information must therefore be provided
5More precisely, I am assuming that for all i ∈ [μ− τ,μ+ τ], there is a continuum of voters with identical preferences,
af r a c t i o n(1 − α) of which are "informed" and a fraction α of which are "uninformed".
15to them via campaign messages (e.g. advertisements) .T h ei n t u i t i v ei d e ai st h a tt h e r ei sas e to fv o t e r s
who are only marginally interested in the election, and who therefore receive only information that is
bundled with other products such as TV or radio programming.
After the campaign, both informed and uninformed voters are assumed to vote sincerely for the
candidate whom they prefer given their posterior beliefs.6 Informed voters therefore always vote for
the candidate whom they truly prefer. In the absence of any additional information, uninformed voters
would simply cast their ballots according to their ideological preference.
Candidates may improve their chances of winning the election by sending a campaign message
to uninformed voters. Those who have a positive advertisable characteristic can send a campaign
message, denoted m =1 , that credibly reveals this to uninformed voters. The cost of sending such
am e s s a g ei sB.7 Those who lack a positive advertisable characteristic are unable to send such a
message. In contrast to advertisable characteristics, unadvertisable characteristics cannot be revealed
through campaign messages. The “effectiveness” of campaign messages in improving a candidate’s
chance of being elected depends on voter beliefs and is therefore determined in equilibrium.
6It has been argued that sincere voting may not be rational even in a two-candidate election when voters are imperfectly
informed (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). Here, I am assuming that voters rationally interpret campaign messages
and form correct posterior beliefs. Their sincere vote choice, strictly speaking, may not be rational. Also note that I am not
allowing for abstention.
7Note that the advertising choice is discrete in this model. That is, candidates can either choose to send a message to all
voters or not to send a message at all. In this respect, my approach mirrors that of Ashworth (2005). With certain technical
caveats, the main arguments of the paper extend to a model in which campaign messages are transmitted to a fraction of the
electorate that is continuously increasing in campaign spending. (This is the setup developed by Coate 2004a, 2004b). The
main caveat is that this relationship is (sufﬁciently) concave. This implies that the preferred aggregate level of spending
does not grow faster than the size of a candidate’s support group, so that larger donor groups will ﬁnd it optimal to make
smaller per capita contributions. The discrete model allows for a cleaner and more intuitive discussion.
16Donors In order to send a message, candidates of type (1,q u) must raise B dollars by soliciting
contributions from donors. In order to make a general argument, I do not explicitly specify the policy
preferences of donors. Instead I assume that a candidate of type (1,q u) is associated with a donor group
characterized by a size γqu and an “intensity of support” fqu. All members of a donor base are assumed
to be identical. The “intensity of support” fqu represents the value that each individual donor attaches
to having the associated candidate elected. Thus, each donor is willing to contribute fqu · ∆π for an
increase of ∆π in the candidate’s probability of winning. That is, donors are electorally motivated and
their willingness to contribute depends on the effectiveness of campaign spending in improving their
preferred candidate’s chance of being elected.
Since individual contributions constitute a public good among the members of a donor group, an
uncoordinated voluntary contributions mechanism would not yield positive contributions in this con-
text. I therefore assume that the members of each group coordinate their decisions and share the cost
of their aggregate contribution equally.8
Sequence of events T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :( 1) Nature draws one candidate for each
party, (2) donors make campaign contributions, (3) candidates send messages, and (4) voters update
their beliefs and vote.
8The precise mechanism underlying the group’s decision is unimportant, since all members are identical. Alternatively,
this assumption can be interpreted as stating that donors follow a sort of Kantian imperative, each independently giving the
amount that they believe would be the optimal per capita contribution for their group. (For a similar approach, see Roemer’s
(2005) notion of a “Kantian Equilibrium”.)
173.4 Analysis
Candidate reputations and the effectiveness of campaign messages The effects of campaign mes-
sages on voters’ beliefs and behavior depends on what types of candidates they believe are sending such
messages. Beliefs concerning the behavior of a type (qa,q u) candidate are denoted ˆ λ(qa,qu) ∈ {0,1}.
If voters believe that a type (qa,q u) candidate sends a message, we write ˆ λ(qa,qu) =1 . Otherwise,
ˆ λ(qa,qu) =0 . Since only candidates with favorable advertisable characteristics can send messages, we
must have ˆ λ(0,qu) =0 .T h u s , o n l yˆ λ(1,0) and ˆ λ(1,1) are determined in equilibrium. A vector of such
beliefs is denoted ˆ λ =
³




Given beliefs ˆ λ, an uninformed voter can determine his expected utility from electing a candidate
depending on whether or not she hass e n tam e s s a g ed u r i n gt h ec a m p aign. Note that voters always
know a candidate’s party label, so that campaign messages only affect beliefs about nonideological
characteristics. A voter who sees a campaign advertisement learns that the candidate has a favorable
advertisable characteristic, i.e. that qa =1 . This is the message’s explicit information content. In
addition, the voter forms posterior beliefs concerning the probability that qu =1 . These beliefs are
determined by ˆ λ, and they constitute the message’s implicit information content. If a candidate has
sentnomessage duringthecampaign, the uninformed voter receives no explicit information and instead
forms posterior beliefs about both advertisable and unadvertisable characteristics. These beliefs will
likewise depend on ˆ λ.




as the weighted average of informed and unin-
formed voters’ expected nonideological payoff from electing her, given her real type, the message she
sends, and voter beliefs. Recall that informed voters know the true type of each candidate irrespec-
tive of the message she sends. Thus, given beliefs ˆ λ, a candidate of type (qa,q u) who sends message





=( 1− α) · uv (qa,q u)+α · E[uv(qa,q u)|m, ˆ λ]
Note that the presence of informed voters (i.e. α<1) implies that a candidate’s reputation is an
increasing function of her true value to voters. In addition, it depends on whether she sends a campaign
message and how this affects the posterior expectations of uninformed voters (if α>0).




, to be equal to the difference between an unin-
formed voter’s expected payoff from electing a candidate who has sent a message compared to one who





= E[uv(qa,q u)|m =1 , ˆ λ] − E[uv(qa,q u)|m = ∅, ˆ λ]
The proof of the following lemma is relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1 Suppose candidates D and R are of type (qDa,q Du) and (qRa,q Ru), and that they send
messages mD and mR, respectively. Then, given beliefs ˆ λ, the probability with which candidate D












qRa,q Ru,m R, ˆ λ
´i
where η and ν are positive exogenous parameters.
That is, the probability with which candidate D wins depends on the ex ante bias in favor of her
party, κ, and the difference between her and her opponent’s reputations. Given voter beliefs ˆ λ,a
candidate of type (1,q u) who sends a message will therefore increase her probability of winning the




















·fqu. Recall that donors
share the cost of their aggregate contribution equally. Since the total cost of sending a message is B,
they face a binary decision of whether or not to donate B












γqu,t h e y





γqu, they are indifferent. In this case, I will
assume that they choose to contribute. Thus, in the absence of contribution limits, a function mapping













· γqu · fqu ≥ B
α·η
0 otherwise










is positive, (b) The size and / or intensity of her support base is large enough.
Campaign contributions and communication under a contribution limit Suppose that a contribu-
tion limit of l dollars is imposed. Then, a candidate can collect at most γqu · l dollars. Therefore she




·γqu ·fqu > B
α·η (as above) and in addition γqu > B
l . Thus,













if γqu ≥ B
l
0 otherwise
for qu =0 ,1
That is, a contribution limit “blocks” messages sent by candidates with contribution bases smaller
than B
l because the individual contributions necessary to ﬁnance their campaigns would exceed the
limit. In this way, the model captures the basic intuition that a contribution limit will tend to affect
those who have fewer supporters while leaving those with large support bases unaffected.










2 such that λ
∗ is the advertising pattern that arises when voter beliefs are given
by λ
∗ (and therefore the effectiveness of advertising is ξ




(1,qu) = λ(1,q u|λ
∗) for qu =0 ,1
An equilibrium under a limit l is a vector of advertising levels e λ
∗
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Voter welfare T h ew e l f a r em e a s u r eIu s et oe v a l u a t et h ee f fects of a contribution limit is the median
voter’s expected utility given a particular equilibrium advertising pattern. Speciﬁcally, suppose that the
equilibrium advertising pattern is given by λ ∈ {0,1}2. (It does not matter whether it is the result of
a laissez-faire or policy equilibrium.) Then a monotone transformation of the median voter’s expected




σ(1,q u) · λ(1,qu) · ξ (λ) · [uv(1,q u) − ¯ uv]
where ¯ uv = σa · (1 − σu · z) is his expected nonideological utilityf r o me l e c t i n ga na v e r a g e( i . e .r a n -
domly drawn) candidate.
This measure conveniently represents the value of an advertising pattern to voters, calling attention
to the interrelated objectives of maximizing both the volume λ(1,qu) and effectiveness ξ (λ) of campaign
messages sent by above average candidates (those for whom [uv(1,q u) − uv] > 0). Note that this
measure is equal to zero when no advertising takes place. Thus W (λ) measures welfare relative to a
benchmark of prohibiting all contributions and spending.
21Pooling vs. separating equilibria Borrowing the terminology familiar from the signaling literature,
equilibrium advertising patterns can be grouped according to whether they are associated with “sepa-
rating” or “pooling” equilibria. A pooling equilibrium is one in which either both candidates of type
(1,0) and those of type (1,1) advertise or one in which neither type does so. In the former case, voters
can distinguish all candidates who exhibit positive advertisable characteristics from those who do not,
but they cannot distinguish between them based on unadvertisable characteristics. In the latter case,
voters are completely unable to distinguish different candidate types. In a separating equilibrium, only
one candidate type (i.e. either type (1,0) or type (1,1)) advertises, and her message therefore perfectly
reveals her type to voters. All other types remain indistinguishable from one another.
The distinction between pooling and separating equilibria is relevant because the informational
effect of a contribution limit is that under certain conditions it will cause a shift from a pooling equi-
librium to a separating equilibrium. For example, suppose that the status quo (before imposition of a
contribution limit) is the pooling equilibrium λ
∗ =( 1 ,1). That is, suppose both “public” and “special
interest” candidates are able to ﬁnance political advertisements in equilibrium. In this case, a voter who
observes a campaign message learns tha tt h ec a n d i d a t ee x h i b i t sap r e f e r r ed advertisable characteristic,
but he cannot make an inference about her unadvertisable characteristic. If a contribution limit prevents
“special interest” candidates from advertising, it may shift the situation to the separating equilibrium
λ
∗ =( 1 ,0), in which only “public interest” candidates advertise. In this new equilibrium, campaign
advertisements reveal that the candidate exhibits favorable advertisable and unadvertisable character-
istics. The cost of obtaining this increased information content is that “special interest” types are no
longer able to distinguish themselves from those who lack positive advertisable characteristics. The
net beneﬁt associated with a contribution limit therefore depends on whether it is more important to
22distinguish between candidates based on advertisable or unadvertisable characteristics. More generally,
I summarize the conditions under which voters prefer a limit be imposed in a series of propositions.
Proposition 1 Suppose z ≥ 1
σu,a n dl e tfqu →∞for qu =0 ,1 (i.e. suppose donors are sufﬁciently
motivated).9 Then, λ
∗ =( 0 ,0) and advertising is ineffective. Voter welfare increases with the impo-
sition of a limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1, i.e. if and only if public interest candidates are supported by
larger donor groups (and therefore collect smaller contributions) than special interest candidates.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. If the cost of electing a special interest candi-
date is signiﬁcantly larger than the beneﬁt associated with a favorable advertisable characteristic, and if
special interest candidates are common enough among those who exhibit favorable advertisable char-
acteristics, voters would be concerned that an advertising candidate is a special interest type. (They are
“rationally cynical.”) Therefore, campaign advertisements are ineffective and no candidate advertises
in equilibrium. As a consequence, uninformed voters obtain no information about candidate charac-
teristics and are left to base their voting decisions on party labels. In this case, preventing the special
interest type from advertisingcan remove the negative connotation associated with campaign messages.
In the Supreme Court’s words, this corresponds to a reduction in the appearance of (“new”) corruption.
As a result, campaign messages will become more effective and public interest candidates will choose
to advertise. This leads to a separating equilibrium, allowing uninformed voters to identify and select
preferred candidates.





, and let fqu →∞for qu =0 ,1. Then, λ
∗ =( 1 ,1) and advertising
9All propositions assume that “donors are sufﬁciently motivated”. If this assumption is not satisﬁed, the statements
would become more complicated but the substantive content of the general argument would not be affected.
23is effective. Voter welfare increases with the imposition of a limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1, i.e. if andonly if
public interest candidates are supported by larger groups (and therefore collect smaller contributions)
than special interest candidates.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the cost of electing a special interest candidate and / or their frequency among those who exhibit
positive advertisable characteristics is small enough, campaign advertising will be effective even when
voters know that such candidates are advertising. Note that this is true even though z>1,i . e .e v e n
though the cost of the special interest transfer completely outweighs the beneﬁt associated with the
advertisable characteristic. In this case, blocking the special interest type is beneﬁcial for two reasons.
First, uninformed voters avoid selecting special interest candidates. That is, they are no longer being
“fooled” into forming inﬂated expectations of a candidate’s true quality. Second, because they are
aware of this, voters are less cynical. Therefore, as in the previous case, the effectiveness of advertising
increases and strengthens selection in favor of the most preferred (1,0) type.
Proposition 3 Suppose z ∈ [1
2,1), and let fqu →∞for qu =0 ,1. Then, λ
∗ =( 1 ,1) and advertising
is effective. Voter welfare increases with the imposition of a limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1,a n dσu <
σu (z,σa),w h e r eσu (z,σa) is increasing in z and σa.
Proof. See Appendix
For z ∈ [1
2,1), special interest candidates with positive advertisable qualiﬁcations are preferred by
voters to those who lack such qualiﬁcations. That is, the cost of the special interest transfer, z,d o e s
not fully outweigh the value of the advertisable characteristic. Thus, all candidates who have positive
advertisable characteristics are pre f e r r e dt ot h o s ew h od on o t .I nt h i sc a s e ,p r e v e n t i n gs p e c i a li n t e r e s t
typesfromadvertisingwouldgeneratebothbeneﬁtsandcosts. Speciﬁcally, blockingthespecialinterest
24type enables voters to select public interest over special interest candidates among those who exhibit
positive advertisable characteristics, generating a beneﬁtt h a ti si n c r e a s i n gi nz and in σa. On the other
hand, voters would no longer be able to distinguish special interest candidates who exhibit positive
advertisable characteristics from those who lack such characteristics. The welfare loss associated with
this is decreasing in z and σa, and increasing in σu. In sum, the net beneﬁt of blocking the special
interest type is increasing in z and σa and decreasing in σu. Therefore, voters will prefer that a limit be
imposed only if z and σa are large and σu is small.
Proposition 4 Suppose z ∈ (0, 1
2),a n dl e tfqu →∞for qu =0 ,1. Then, λ
∗ =( 1 ,1) and advertising is
effective. Voter welfare increases with the imposition of a limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1, σa > ¯ σa(z),a n d
σu ∈ (σu (z,σa),σu (z,σa)),w h e r eσu (z,σa) is decreasing in z and σa,a n dσu (z,σa) is increasing
in z and σa.
For very small special interest costs, voters are likely to be more concerned with distinguishing
between those who have and those who lack positive advertisable characteristics than they are with
identifying public interest types. The latter concern dominates only to the extent that most candidates
have positive advertisable characteristics anyway (σa is large) and if there is enough variation in the
unadvertisable characteristic such that it is interesting to learn about it (σu is neither too large nor too
small.) Again, these conditions on σa and σu essentially say that the unadvertisable characteristic must
be sufﬁciently important.
3.5 Summary and empirical question
To summarize, the analysis shows that a campaign contribution limit will have a positive effect on
voter welfare if and only if two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst is that a candidate’s reliance on
25l a r g ec o n t r i b u t i o n si sr e l a t e dt oh e r unadvertisable characteristics. The interpretation above was that
candidates who rely on large contributions are likely to serve “special interests”. The second is that
these hidden characteristics are sufﬁciently important relative to advertisable characteristics that can
be explicitly revealed through campaign communication. I conclude that these conditions constitute
the key assumptions underlying the equalization argument in support of contribution limits. Intuitively,
these are the conditions under which it would make sense for voters to employ the results of a “money
primary” as an indicator of whom they would like to support in the election.
As I pointed out in the introduction, the question whether the conditions are satisﬁed is ultimately
empirical in nature. Putting aside the constitutional debate over its compatibility with the First Amend-
ment, the practical theory underlying the equalization argument can therefore be empirically investi-
gated. Speciﬁcally, the model makes the following empirical prediction when voters prefer that a limit
be imposed.
Proposition 5 Suppose α<1. (I.e. not all voters are uninformed.) Then, if voters prefer that a limit be
imposed, an advertising candidate’s vote share is decreasing in the size of her individual contributions.
That is, holding constant her aggregate level of spending as well as the type and spending of her
opponent, a candidate who collects large individual contributions attains a lower vote share than a
candidate who collects small contributions.
Proof. See discussion below.
This result follows directly from the form of the vote share and probability of winning functions.
Speciﬁcally, a candidate’s vote share depends positively on the expected utilities of both uninformed
and informed voters. It follows that special interest types attain smaller vote shares, other things equal.
Voters beneﬁt from a contribution limit only if these less popular candidates rely more heavily on large
26contributions. (Note that th i si san e c e s s a r y ,n o tas u f ﬁcient condition, as we are inherently unable to
evaluate the magnitude of the difference.)
4 Is reliance on large contributions negatively related to public
support?
In the following section, I attempt to assess whether there is empirical evidence that a candidate’s
reliance on large contributions is negatively related to her degree of public support. Obviously the
main difﬁculty in this context is how to measure public support. It appears that the most objective
measure available is a candidate’s electoral success. However, the premise of the whole discussion
about campaign ﬁnance is that electoral outcomes are a func t i o no fc a m p a i g ns p e n d i n ga sw e l la s
candidates’ true popularity. Therefore, spending must be controlled for. The question I seek to answer
in the following section is whether a candidate’s electoral success is negatively related to her reliance
on large campaign contributions after the impact of campaign spending has been controlled for. Note
that this approach is consistent with the formal model presented above, which suggested that voter-
preferred candidates will tend to achieve larger vote shares than others who spend the same amounts
(see Proposition 5).
4.1 Data and Empirical strategy
The data set I use comprises 1735 elections to the House of Representatives held between 1990 and
2002.10 The dependent variable in all regressions is the challenger’s share of the vote. The independent
10All elections are challenger-incumbent contests between a Republican and a Democratic candidate in which both can-
didates attained at least ten percent of the vote.
27variables I use include the candidates’ levels of spending and other factors commonly controlled for,
such as the strength of the challenger’s party in the district, national partisan tides, and the challenger’s
political experience. As a measure of a candidate’s reliance on large contributions, I include the fraction
of her total receipts due to contributions in excess of $750. (The contribution limit during this period
was $1000.) Information on candidate receipts, spending, and contribution sizes is taken from FEC data
sets.11 These data also include information on party labels, incumbency status, and electoral outcomes.
Information about challenger experience in elective ofﬁce was obtained from a data set compiled and
provided by Gary Jacobson.12
As outlined above, the empirical approach I follow is based on the idea that a candidate’s electoral
success is determined by a combination of her campaign spending and her “actual” level of public sup-
port. This suggest that, holding constant the level of campaign spending and other factors, differences
in candidates’ electoral success reﬂect different levels of public support. Ceteris paribus, “truly pop-
ular” candidates are expected to be more successful on election day than less popular candidates who
spend the same amount on their campaigns. According to the equalization argument discussed above,
such candidates should rely less heavily on large contributions. Therefore, I want to test whether candi-
dates who rely more heavily on large contributions tend to do worse in the election after spending and
other factors have been controlled for.
Theeconometricspeciﬁcation I employ builds on previous empirical studies aimedat estimating the
effects of campaign spending (Jacobson 1978, 1990; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990). As discussed in
thatliterature, thecentraleconometricprobleminthiscontextistheendogeneityofspending, especially
by incumbents. Incumbents tend to raise their expenditures when faced with a strong challenger or
11I thank Paul Clark at the FEC for his assistance in working with these data sets.
12I thank Gary Jacobson for sharing these data with me.
28other electoral troubles. Therefore the incumbent’s spending is positively correlated with unmeasured
factors that harm her electoral prospects, leading the econometrician to underestimate its effectiveness.
Although my main concern here is not to acquire consistent estimates of the returns to spending, this
endogeneity problem leads to biased estimates of all coefﬁcients. Therefore, I take a two stage least
squares approach similar to that proposed by Green and Krasno (1988), using lagged incumbent spend-
ing as an instrument for current spending. The idea is that the incumbent’s lagged spending is related
to her overall ability to collect contributions but unrelated to the quality of her current opponent.13
The main difference between my estimations and those done in previous studies is that I include a
measure of the candidates’ reliance on large contributions among the dependent variables. Speciﬁcally,
I use the fraction of both candidates’ total receipts due to donations in excess of $750.The question of
interest is whether this statistic has a signiﬁcant effect on a candidate’s vote share. If so, a negative
effect would lend support to the central assumption underlying the equalization argument in support of
contribution limits. That is, it would suggest that campaign contribution limits have the desired effect
of reducing the receipts of “unpopular” candidates. An insigniﬁcant or positive effect, by contrast,
would suggest that such limits may lead to the unintended consequence of reducing the receipts of
an essentially arbitrary set of candidates (if the effect is insigniﬁcant), or of systematically harming
“popular” candidates (if it is positive).
I am aware of only one other study that has looked at the relationship between candidate fund-
raising statistics and electoral success (Dharmapala and Palda 2000). In that analysis, the authors
speculate that the concentration of a candidate’s contribution sources may be related to her public ap-
peal, and suggest that this hypothesis can be tested by estimating the relationship between a “campaign
contribution concentration index” and electoral success. For challengers and open seat candidates,
13See Green and Krasno (1988, 1990) and Jacobson (1990) for an interesting discussion of these econometric issues.
29Dharmapala and Palda show that, controlling for a candidate’s share of spending in the district, there
is a negative relationship between concentration of contribution sources and electoral success. The
authors suggest that their result is evidence that campaign contributions constitute “speech” and are
therefore protected under the First Amendment.
4.2 Speciﬁcation and Results
I estimate a model in which the challenger’s share of the vote (chl_vote) is a linear function of her
district party strength, deﬁned as the share of the vote attained by her party’s candidate in the previous
election (chl_dps), her level of spending (chl_spend), the incumbent’s spending (inc_spend), her party
label (chl_dem), whether she has previously held elective ofﬁce (chl_exper), and the share of both
candidates’ receipts due to individual contributions above $750 (chl_frac750p and inc_frac750p). As I
have mentioned, an instrumental variable approach is necessary due to the endogeneity of incumbent
spending. Like Green and Krasno (1988), I use lagged spending as an instrument for current spending.
More speciﬁcally, the ﬁr s ts t e pi st or e g r e s si n c u m b e n ts p e nding on lagged spending (denoted
inc_lag) and all other exogenous variables. The corresponding instrumental variable equation is
inc_spend∗ = α0+α1·chl_dps+α2·chl_spend+α3·inc_lag+α4·chl_dem
+α5·chl_exper+α6·chl_frac750p+α7·inc_frac750p+e.
The ﬁtted values, \ inc_spend
∗
, are then used in place of inc_spend in the second stage equation,





to consistent estimates. The estimates obtained by this procedure are reported in Table 1. Table 2 shows
30the estimates of the instrumental variable equation.
Note ﬁrst that the estimated effects of campaign spending are consistent with those obtained in
previous studies. Speciﬁcally, challenger spending is found to have a signiﬁcant positive effect on the
challenger’s vote share. For example, in 1994 an increase of $100 000 in the challenger’s spending was
associated with an increase of 1.3 percent in her vote share. As expectecd, estimated coefﬁcients on
incumbent spending are negative for all years except 2002, though they are small and signiﬁcant only
for 1994, 2000, and in the pooled regression. This suggests that incumbent spending has only a weak
marginal effect on vote shares. For example, the pooled regression suggests that an increase of $100
000 in the incumbent’s spending was associated witha ni n c r e a s eo fo n l y0 . 1p e r c e n ti nh e rv o t es h a r e .
I now turn to the question of interest. Namely, is reliance on large contributions negatively related to
electoral success? The estimated coefﬁcients associated with the share of the challenger’s contributions
above $750 are positive in all years except 1992, where it is small and insigniﬁcant. They are positive
and signiﬁcant in all other years except 1996, as well as in the pooled regression. The pooled estimate
of 5.7 suggests that an increase of 20 percent in the fraction of challenger receipts due to large contri-
butions was associated with an increase of just over one percent in her vote share. The corresponding
results for incumbents are similar but less signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcients on the share of the
incumbent’s receipts due to large contributions are negative in all years except 1998 and 2000, where
they are insigniﬁcant. It is negative and signiﬁcant in 1994 and in the pooled regression. The pooled
estimate of -2.48 suggests that an increase of 40 percent in the share of the incumbent’s receipts due to





Table 1. Estimates of 2SLS models, 1992-2002 
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002  Pooled 
Challenger’s district party strength 0.454 0.579 0.688 0.571 0.630 0.522 0.600 
(0.068)*** (0.063)*** (0.047)*** (0.050)*** (0.052)*** (0.048)*** (0.023)*** 
Challenger’s spending (in $100K) 3.030 1.349 0.598 0.811 0.527 0.331 0.584 
(0.482)*** (0.215)*** (0.134)*** (0.136)*** (0.104)*** (0.098)*** (0.056)*** 
Incumbent’s  spending  (in  $100K) -0.334 -0.299 -0.013 -0.058 -0.235 0.149 -0.099 
(0.331) (0.179)* (0.111)  (0.064) (0.106)** (0.162)  (0.055)* 
Challenger is a Democrat -0.317  -9.465  7.878  2.022  2.032  -2.410   
(1.005)  (0.926)*** (0.716)*** (0.743)*** (0.674)*** (0.725)***   
Challenger  has  previously  held  elective  office 1.838 1.867 2.924 1.405 1.586 0.715 2.362 
(1.215) (1.123)*  (0.847)***  (0.839)* (0.755)**  (0.933) (0.395)*** 
Share of challenger’s total receipts due to 
individual  contributions  above  $750 -0.352 6.870 3.946 6.518 4.000 6.760 5.741 
(5.047) (3.920)* (2.767)  (2.986)** (2.364)*  (2.574)***  (1.326)*** 
Share of incumbent’s total receipts due to 
individual contributions above $750 -5.698  -8.859  -3.978  2.403  1.579  -5.680  -2.480 
(6.398) (4.037)** (2.565)  (2.846) (2.657) (3.989)  (1.428)* 
Constant 16.963  17.685  4.556 8.696 9.419  13.933  12.273 
(2.354)*** (2.002)***  (1.818)**  (1.707)*** (1.851)*** (1.558)*** (0.940)*** 
Observations 194 204 218 191 191 169  1167 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.49 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.62 
Note: The dependent variable is the challenger’s percentage share of the vote. Challenger’s district party strength is the percentage share of the vote attained by the 
challenger’s party’s candidate in the previous election. Incumbent spending is instrumented using lagged spending. (Races involving freshmen are therefore excluded.) 
The instrumental variable equations are reported in table 2. Spending has been adjusted for inflation (1990 = 1.00). The pooled regression includes year-specific 
intercepts and party label effects not reported in the table. For detailed results, refer to column 2 of Table 3 in the appendix. Standard errors are in parentheses; * 





Table 2. Estimates of IV equations, 1992-2002 
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002  Pooled 
Challenger’s district party strength 0.002  0.032 -0.108 -0.162 -0.096 0.023 -0.036 
(0.030) (0.031)  (0.031)***  (0.033)*** (0.053)* (0.046)  (0.016)** 
Challenger’s spending (in $100K) 1.059 0.459 0.680 0.513 0.757 0.495 0.659 
(0.153)*** (0.098)*** (0.061)*** (0.082)*** (0.055)*** (0.062)*** (0.029)***
Incumbent’s  spending  in  previous  election 0.563 0.539 0.877 1.078 0.787 0.284 0.610 
(0.083)*** (0.049)*** (0.062)*** (0.043)*** (0.079)*** (0.045)*** (0.024)***
Challenger is a Democrat -0.167  -0.882  0.236  1.229  0.233  0.083   
(0.447) (0.457)* (0.460)  (0.459)*** (0.640)  (0.716)   
Challenger has previously held elective office -0.145  0.313  0.931  0.518  0.697  0.855  0.488 
(0.546)  (0.568) (0.542)* (0.522) (0.715) (0.899)  (0.276)* 
Share of challenger’s total receipts due to 
individual contributions above $750 1.867  -0.140  -1.439  -0.725  1.195  1.287  0.561 
(2.225) (1.984) (1.785) (1.854) (2.244) (2.527) (0.927) 
Share of incumbent’s total receipts due to 
individual contributions above $750 9.391  1.506  0.210  -1.993  1.670  10.733  2.849 
(2.330)*** (2.007) (1.649) (1.777) (2.500)  (3.198)*** (0.976)***
Constant 0.702 0.768 3.755 3.964 3.306 2.142 2.411 
(1.041) (1.018)  (1.144)***  (1.081)*** (1.789)* (1.545)  (0.650)***
Observations 194 204 218 191 191 169  1167 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.47 0.54 0.69 0.81 0.71 0.50 0.62 
Note: The dependent variable is the incumbent’s spending in $100K. Challenger’s district party strength is the percentage share of the vote attained by the 
challenger’s party’s candidate in the previous election. Spending has been adjusted for inflation (1990 = 1.00). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Overall, these results suggest that there is an insigniﬁcant or possibly even weakly positive relation-
ship between a candidate’s reliance on large contributions and her electoral success. Contrary to the
expectation underlying the money primary analogy, it does not appear to be the case that a candidate
who collects ﬁve hundred $1000 is less popular than one who collects one thousand $500 contributions.
I argued above that such a result would cast doubt on the central assumption underlying the equalization
argument in support of contribution limits, namely that reliance on large contributions reﬂe c t sal a c ko f
public support. Although evidence for a positive relationship between reliance on large contributions
and vote share is weak, these results suggests that contribution limits may indeed have the unintended
effect of reducing the resources of popular candidates.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Campaign contribution limits are in large part advocated on the grounds that they democratize the
ﬁnancing of campaigns and cause campaign resources to reﬂect public support for candidates and their
political ideas. Despite lingering questions as to its compatibility with the First Amendment, I have
argued that the Supreme Court’s opinions in Buckley and Austin indicate a certain level of support
for what I have called the equalization argument in support of contribution limits. Speciﬁcally, while
the Court rejected an equalization of candidates’ aggregate expenditures, it implicitly endorsed the
objective of equalizing the inﬂuence of individual donors in determining how large those aggregate
expenditures will be. As a practical matter, the Court explicitly stated that it expected contribution
limits to increase the correlation between candidates’ aggregate resources and public support.
Using a simple formal model, I demonstrated that the equalization argument and the corresponding
money primary analogy are based on a speciﬁc set of practical assumptions. The central assumption is
34that candidates who rely heavily on large contributions exhibit less popular characteristics than those
who rely on small contributions. Another is that the characteristics in question are “unadvertisable,”
so that popular candidates are unable to explicitly distinguish themselves through campaign commu-
nication. The ﬁnal assumption is that the kind of information that can be explicitly revealed through
campaign advertising is less important to voters than are unadvertisable characteristics. Under these
assumptions, a contribution limit prevents unpopular candidates from advertising and thus enables un-
informed voters to distinguish truly preferred candidates from those who exhibit unpopular hidden
characteristics.
In addition, the formal model suggested a method of empirically testing these assumptions. Speciﬁ-
cally, when voters prefer that a contribution limit be imposed, a candidate’s vote share will be positively
related to her level of spending but negatively related to her reliance on large contributions. I tested
this hypothesis using data on congressional elections held between 1990 and 2002. The empirical es-
timations showed that, controlling for her aggregate level of spending, a candidate’s reliance on large
contributions has an insigniﬁcant or even a weakly positive effect on her vote share. This result casts
doubt on the equalization argument in support of contribution limits.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Informedvotersknowthecandidates’types, soaninformedvoterwithideologyiwillvoteforcandidate
D if uv(qDa,q Du)−φ·i>u v(qRa,q Ru)−φ·(1−i). An uninformed voter with ideology i will vote for
candidate D after seeing the pair of messages (mD,m R) ∈ {0,1,∅}2 if E
h





uv(qRa,q Ru)|mR, ˆ λ
i
−φ·(1−i). Given arealization of μ, thefraction ofinformed voters casting








4τφ·[uv(qDa,q Du) − uv(qRa,q Ru)]. The fraction of unin-














































Thus, deﬁning the candidate’s reputation as ρj
³
qja,q ju,λ j,b λ
´
=( 1− α) · uv(qja,q ju)
+α ·
³











































Given a pair of competing candidates (qDa,q Du) and (qRa,q Ru), candidate D wins the election if and
onlyifthemedianvoter,μ, isfarenoughtotheleftgiventherelativereputationsofthecandidates. I.e. if




∗) − ρ(qRa,q Ru,λ
∗)]
and ρ(qa,q u,λ
∗)=( 1−α)·uv (qa,q u)+α·ξ (λ
∗)·λ
∗
(qa,qu). Given this value ˜ μ, the median voter’s ex-



















σ(qRa,q Ru) · E [Uv|qDa,q Du,q Ra,q Ru,λ
∗].
Notice that V (0) is simply a constant. Subtracting it from V (λ
∗) yields V (λ








(qa,qu) ·[uv (qa,q u) − ¯ uv]. Finally, we can divide by the constant α2
4rφ to get the
36normalized welfare measure.
Equilibrium conditions
Here, I derive and discuss the conditions for laissez-faire equilibrium. The conditions for policy are
analogous in a straightforward way (i.e. by simply excluding equilibria in which excluded types adver-
tise and dropping the condition for those types in other equilibria.). Simple calculations show that the





σ(qa,q u) · λ
∗




















where σ(qa,q u) denotes the probability of drawing a candidate of type (qa,q u) and ¯ uv is the expected
utility from a randomly chosen candidate.
Suppose that λ
∗ =( 1 ,0). That is, only the (1,0) type advertises in equilibrium. Then the effec-





. Note that this is positive. Thus,
the (1,0) type will advertise if γ0 · f0 · ξ (1,0) > 1
η · B. Further, since the (1,1) type is not ad-
vertising, we must have γ(1) · f(1) · ξ (1,0) < 1
η · B. Voter welfare in this equilibrium is given by
W∗(1,0) =
σa·(1−σu)
1−σa·(1−σu) · [1 − σa · (1 − σu · z)]
2.
Suppose that λ
∗ =( 0 ,1).That is, the (1,0) type does not advertise and the (1,1) type advertises






Advertising is effective in this equilibrium only if z< 1−σa
1−σu·σa.F o r t h e (1,0) type not to advertise
under these circumstances, it must be that γ0 · f0 · ξ (0,1) < B
η ,w h i l ef o rt h e(1,1) type to do so, we
must haveγ1 · f1 · ξ (0,1) > B
η . Voter welfare in this equilibrium is given by W∗(0,1) = σa·σu
1−σu·σa ·
[1 − σa − (1 − σu · σa) · z]
2.
37Suppose that λ
∗ =( 1 ,1), i.e. candidates of type (1,0) and (1,1) each advertise with probability
1. The effectiveness of advertising is ξ (1,1) = 1 − σu · z. Advertising is effective if z< 1
σu,i . e .i f
the cost of electing a “special interest” candidate is not too large. Since both types of candidates are
choosing to advertise, we must have γ0 · f0 · ξ (1,1) > B
η and γ1 · f1 · ξ (1,1) > B
η . Voter welfare in
this equilibrium is given by W∗(1,1) = σa · (1 − σa) · (1 − σu · z)
2
Finally, suppose that λ
∗ =( 0 ,0), i.e. no candidate advertises. In this case, effectiveness is not well
deﬁned. We are therefore free to specify beliefs for voters. Suppose that voters believe that a candidate
who advertises in this equilibrium is a special interest type with probability ˆ qu (0,0). Since no one
advertises, not deviating will lead to a reputation of ¯ uv. Then, the effectiveness of advertising in the
“no ad” equilibrium is given by ξ (0,0) = (1 − σa)−(ˆ qu (0,0) − σaσu)·z. Since no advertising takes
place, this is the benchmark situation in which voter welfare is equal to zero.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Note that ξ(1,1) = 1 − σu · z<0. That is, messages would be ineffective if both candidates were
advertising. This rules out the pooling equilibrium (1,1).S i n c efqu →∞ , we cannot have a separating
equilibrium because both candidates will advertise when messages are effective. Therefore, the unique
equilibrium is λ
∗ =( 0 ,0). Beliefs are chosen such that deviations from the no advertising equilibrium
are ineffective. For example, voters may believe that a candidate who advertis e si sas p e c i a li n t e r e s t
type with probability ˆ qu(0,0) = σu.T h e nξ(0,0) = 1−σu ·z − ¯ uv =( 1−σa)·(1−σu·z) < 0.V o t e r
welfare is W(0,0) = 0. Now consider the effects of a contribution limit. If γ0 >γ 1,al i m i tj u s tb e l o w
B
γ1 will prevent special interest candidates from advertising. Then, since ξ(1,0) > 0, ˜ λ
∗
=( 1 ,0).T h a t
is, public interest candidates will advertise effectively in the policy equilibrium. Thus welfare increases
38to W(1,0) > 0.I fγ0 <γ 1, a limit will prevent either public interest candidates or both candidates
from advertising. Since ξ(0,1) < 0, advertising will remain ineffective and the policy equilibrium will
be ˜ λ
∗
=( 0 ,0). Thus welfare remains unchanged. So when z ≥ 1
σu, voters beneﬁt from the imposition
of a contribution limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Note that ξ(1,1) = 1 − σu · z>0.T h u s ,f o rfqu large enough, λ
∗ =( 1 ,1). Also note that ξ(1,0) >
ξ(1,1) and ∆uv (1,1) < 0. Thus, W(1,0)−W(1,1) = σa·(1−σu)·(ξ(1,0) − ξ(1,1))·∆uv (1,0)−
σa · σu · ξ(1,1) · ∆uv (1,1) > 0. That is, since effectiveness of advertising increases and the special
interest type’s message contributes negatively to voter welfare, voters would prefer that only the public
interest candidate advertises. Thus, as in the previous case, voters beneﬁt from the imposition of a
contribution limit if and only if γ0 >γ 1.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
I will prove both claims simultaneously. Suppose z ∈ (0,1).T h e nξ(1,1) = (1 − σu · z) > 0. Thus,
for fqu large enough, λ
∗ =( 1 ,1).V o t e rw e l f a r ei sW(1,1) > 0. Suppose γ0 <γ 1, the imposition of
a contribution limit results in either ˜ λ
∗
=( 0 ,0) or ˜ λ
∗
=( 0 ,1). The former will occur if ξ(0,1) < 0,
i.e. if z> 1−σa
(1−σu·σa). Then welfare drops from W(1,1) > 0 to W(1,1) = 0. ˜ λ
∗
=( 0 ,1) will occur
if and only if z< 1−σa
(1−σu·σa). This implies ∆uv (1,1) = 1 − σa − (1 − σaσu) · z>0.A l s on o t et h a t
ξ(1,1) − ξ(0,1) = (1 − σu) · z +
σa·(1−σu)
1−σaσu > 0. Therefore,
W(0,1) − W(1,1) = σa · σu · (ξ(0,1) − ξ(1,1)) · ∆uv (1,1) − σa · (1 − σu) · ξ(1,1) · ∆uv (1,0) < 0
39That is, since effectiveness of advertising decreases and both special and public interest candidates’
messages contribute positively to voter welfare, welfare must decrease with the imposition of a contri-
bution limit when γ0 <γ 1.
Suppose γ0 >γ 1. In this case, the imposition of a limit results in ˜ λ
∗
=( 1 ,0). The change in
effectiveness and welfare that results depends on the probabilities σa and σu. In particular,
ξ(1,0) − ξ(1,1) =
σu · [z · (1 + σaσu) − σa]
1 − σa · (1 − σu)






(note that this is always true for z>σ a, otherwise it depends on σu.) More importantly, the change in
welfare that results from a contribution limit is equal to
W(1,0) − W(1,1) =
σa · (1 − σu)
1 − σa · (1 − σu)
· [1 − σa · (1 − σu · z)]
2 − σa · (1 − σa) · (1 − σu · z)
2
so that for z ∈ (0,1) and γ0 >γ 1, welfare will increase with the imposition of a contribution limit if
a n do n l yi f
σa >
1 − z · (2 − σu · z)
1 − z · (2 − σu · (2 − σu) · z)
Due to its nonlinear form, this condition is somewhat difﬁcult to discuss analytically. I therefore
use a graphical representation to aid the interpretation. Speciﬁcally, refer to Figure 2.1. The ﬁgure
is displayed in σa − σu space. The solid lines represent points at which W(1,0) = W(1,1).T h e y




25 (orange), and 3
5 (pink). For each value of z,t h e






welfare increases with the imposition of a contribution limit if and only if σa is large and σu takes on
intermediate values, i.e. if and only if σu ∈ (σu (z,σa),σu (z,σa)),w h e r eσu (z,σa) is decreasing in
z and σa,a n dσu (z,σa) is increasing in z and σa.
For z ∈ [1
2,1), welfare increases with the imposition of a limit if and only if σa is large and σu is
small, i.e. if and only if σu < σu (z,σa),w h e r eσu (z,σa) is increasing in z and σa.A sz increases,
400 1
σu






1      2
Figure 1: Regions in σa − σu space. The solid lines represent points at which W(1,0) = W(1,1).




25 (orange), and 3
5 (pink). For each value of
z, the region in which W(1,0) >W (1,1) is the area above the corresponding solid line. For these
parameter values, voters would prefer that a contribution limit be imposed. The dashed lines represent
points at which ξ(1,0) = ξ(1,1). They are drawn for the corresponging values of z. The effectiveness
of advertising increases with the imposition of a limit for points below this line. For z = 1
2,t h et w o
lines coincide. (Thus, the effectiveness of advertis i n gw o u l dg od o w na f t e rav o t e r - p r e f e r r e dl i m i ti s
imposed.)
41the solid line shifts down and the area in which voters prefer that a limit be imposed encompasses more
and more of the parameter space. When z =1 ,P r o p o s i t i o n2a p p l i e sa n dal i m i ti sb e n e ﬁcial for all





Table 3. Estimates of OLS models, 1990-2002 
  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002  Pooled 
Challenger’s district party strength 0.293 0.331 0.443 0.564 0.615 0.576 0.468 0.517 
(0.060)*** (0.056)*** (0.045)*** (0.039)*** (0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.042)*** (0.018)*** 
Challenger’s spending (in $100K) 1.225 1.726 0.841 0.797 0.295 0.406 0.153 0.383 
(0.269)*** (0.278)*** (0.142)*** (0.099)*** (0.071)*** (0.074)*** (0.050)*** (0.037)*** 
Incumbent’s spending (in $100K) 0.283  0.164  0.290  -0.069  0.025  -0.048  0.191  0.103 
(0.210) (0.136)  (0.100)*** (0.071) (0.058) (0.061)  (0.070)*** (0.033)*** 
Challenger is a Democrat 1.549  0.151  -8.488  6.304  1.648  1.788  -1.885   
(0.884)* (0.953)  (0.770)*** (0.613)*** (0.665)** (0.616)*** (0.717)***  
Challenger has previously held elective 
office 0.868 2.541 1.632 2.361 1.641 0.753 -0.434 2.146 
(1.243) (1.092)**  (0.878)*  (0.713)*** (0.767)** (0.690)  (0.885)  (0.346)*** 
Share of challenger’s total receipts due 
to individual contributions above $750 -0.836 1.735 11.727 3.399  4.088  4.568 11.771 2.076 
(1.012) (4.584)  (3.312)*** (2.667)  (2.031)** (2.258)**  (2.489)*** (0.725)*** 
Share of incumbent’s total receipts due 
to individual contributions above $750 -4.509 -9.471  -11.543  -6.426 0.745 -0.673 -6.361 -4.446 
(4.603) (5.226)*  (3.129)*** (2.463)*** (2.861) (2.526)  (3.321)*  (1.305)*** 
Constant 23.291  19.504  18.866 9.596  7.884 10.456  14.906  14.162 
(2.007)*** (2.070)*** (1.570)*** (1.456)*** (1.608)*** (1.705)*** (1.505)*** (0.854)*** 
Observations 225 242 298 295 249 224 202  1735 
Adjusted  R-squared 0.35 0.42 0.67 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.56 
Note: The dependent variable is the challenger’s percentage share of the vote. Challenger’s district party strength is the percentage share of the vote attained by the 
challenger’s party’s candidate in the previous election. Spending has been adjusted for inflation (1990 = 1.00). The pooled regression includes year-specific intercepts and 
party label effects not reported in the table. For detailed results, refer to column 1 of Table X in the appendix. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Pooled Regressions (detailed results) 
 OLS  2SLS  IV  Equation 
Challenger’s district party strength 0.517  0.600  -0.036 
(0.018)*** (0.023)***  (0.016)** 
Challenger’s spending (in $100K) 0.383  0.584  0.659 
(0.037)*** (0.056)***  (0.029)*** 
Incumbent’s spending (in $100K) 0.103  -0.099   
(0.033)*** (0.055)*   
Challenger has previously held elective office 2.146  2.362  0.488 
(0.346)*** (0.395)***  (0.276)* 
Share of challenger’s total receipts due to 
individual contributions above $750 2.076  5.741  0.561 
(0.725)*** (1.326)***  (0.927) 
Share of incumbent’s total receipts due to 
individual contributions above $750 -4.446  -2.480  2.849 
(1.305)*** (1.428)*  (0.976)*** 
Democratic Challenger in 1990 1.647     
(0.783)**    
Democratic Challenger in 1992 -0.822  -1.066  -0.170 
(0.755) (0.773)  (0.540) 
Democratic Challenger in 1994 -10.322  -9.862  -0.505 
(0.696)*** (0.784)***  (0.548) 
Democratic Challenger in 1996 6.326  7.509  0.605 
(0.674)*** (0.737)***  (0.514) 
Democratic Challenger in 1998 1.965  2.046  1.153 
(0.728)*** (0.776)***  (0.541)** 
Democratic Challenger in 2000 1.555  1.878  0.345 
(0.766)** (0.769)**  (0.538) 
Democratic Challenger in 2002 -2.758  -2.775  0.441 
(0.810)*** (0.818)***  (0.573) 
Dummy for 1990 2.725     
(0.771)***    
Dummy for 1992 0.907  0.770  0.723 
(0.753) (0.764)  (0.539) 
Dummy for 1994 4.854  4.239  -0.491 
(0.715)*** (0.736)***  (0.512) 
Dummy for 1996 -2.971  -4.289  -0.430 
(0.766)*** (0.761)***  (0.529) 
Dummy for 1998 -2.536  -3.095  -1.029 
(0.781)*** (0.805)***  (0.557)* 
Dummy for 2000 -1.963  -2.880  0.300 
(0.781)** (0.779)***  (0.546) 
Incumbent’s spending in previous election     0.610 
   (0.024)*** 
Constant 14.162 12.273  2.411 
(0.854)*** (0.940)***  (0.650)*** 
Observations 1735 1167  1167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56  0.62  0.62 
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the challenger’s percentage share of the vote. The dependent variable in 
column 3 is the incumbent’s spending in $100K. Note the inclusion of year-specific intercepts and party label effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 5. Summary fundraising statistics 
challengers incumbents 
variable mean sd mean sd 
1990 
Spending  in  $100K 1.03 1.76 4.31 2.51 
Receipts  in  $100K 1.05 1.78 4.34 2.27 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.52  0.30  0.43  0.19 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.13  0.20  0.54  0.19 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.25  0.29  0.01  0.04 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.11  0.13  0.10  0.10 
1992 
Spending  in  $100K 1.48 2.03 6.00 3.90 
Receipts  in  $100K 1.58 2.05 5.28 3.41 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.52  0.27  0.45  0.18 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.15  0.21  0.51  0.19 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.17  0.23  0.01  0.03 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.11  0.11  0.11  0.09 
1994 
Spending  in  $100K 1.83 2.64 5.62 3.80 
Receipts  in  $100K 1.94 2.76 5.59 3.32 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.52  0.28  0.47  0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.12  0.18  0.50  0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.20  0.25  0.01  0.04 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.11  0.11  0.13  0.09 
1996 
Spending  in  $100K 2.17 3.49 6.51 5.03 
Receipts  in  $100K 2.25 3.55 6.88 5.28 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.55  0.27  0.52  0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.18  0.22  0.47  0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.17  0.24  0.00  0.02 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.12  0.11  0.16  0.12 
1998 
Spending  in  $100K 2.40 4.60 7.05 6.20 
Receipts  in  $100K 2.40 4.59 7.68 6.03 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.54  0.29  0.51  0.18 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.17  0.21  0.47  0.18 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.18  0.26  0.00  0.02 




Table 5. Summary fundraising statistics 1990 — 2002 (continued) 
challengers incumbents 
variable mean sd mean sd 
2000 
Spending in $100K 3.04 5.98 8.88  7.2 
Receipts in $100K 2.96 5.93 9.07 6.41 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.6 0.26  0.52  0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.14 0.17 0.47 0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.22 0.27  0  0.02 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.17 0.14  0.2  0.11 
2002 
Spending in $100K 2.3 5.29 9.1 5.95 
Receipts in $100K 2.25 5.26 9.29 6.04 
Fraction of receipts due to individual contributions 0.55 0.29 0.52 0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to PAC contributions 0.15 0.21 0.47 0.17 
Fraction of receipts due to candidate contributions 0.26 0.3  0  0.02 
Fraction receipts due to contributions above $750 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.12 
Note: Receipts and expenditures are adjusted for inflation (1990 = 1.00). In order to save space, the 
fraction of receipts due to party contributions is not reported. It is equal to the remainder. 
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